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OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Kenneth Brown appeals a District Court Order denying his petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Brown alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at his trial on first degree murder and other charges because trial counsel failed to object
to the unconstitutional definition of reasonable doubt contained in the trial court’s jury
instructions. He contends that the decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
(“Superior Court”) finding the jury instruction constitutional and rejecting Brown’s
ineffective assistance claim violated clearly established federal law such that Brown is
entitled to habeas relief.
Although we agree with Brown that the trial court’s reasonable doubt formulation
raises grave constitutional concerns, nothing in the Superior Court’s decision as to the
jury instruction was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal Law” under the standard for habeas relief articulated in 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1). Accordingly, we will affirm the Order of the District Court denying Brown’s
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habeas petition.
I.
Cynthia Linthicum was found in her apartment beaten and stabbed to death.
Brown was arrested and indicted on several charges connected to Linthicum’s death. At
Brown’s trial, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows on the definition of reasonable
doubt:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful
and sensible person to pause and hesitate before acting upon a matter of
importance in his or her own affairs.
It is not mere hesitation. A mere hesitation in and of itself is not a
reasonable doubt. But a hesitation concerning the guilt of the defendant
may become a reasonable doubt when and if that hesitation becomes a
restraint, and would then cause you to be restrained from acting in a matter
of the highest importance in your own life.
Brown was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, possession of instruments of crime,
aggravated assault, and theft of movable property.
The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declined to hear the case. Brown filed a pro se petition under the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541 et seq., with the Court of Common
Pleas, and new counsel was appointed to represent Brown. In his PCRA appeal, Brown
alleged, inter alia, that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to
the definition of reasonable doubt given in the trial court’s jury instructions, which Brown
argues was unconstitutional as a violation of due process. The Court dismissed the PCRA
petition, and the Superior Court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s formulation of
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reasonable doubt did not violate due process and, therefore, that trial counsel was not
ineffective for having failed to object to the court’s formulation. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court again denied Brown’s request for allowance of appeal. Brown then filed
a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Federal District Court, arguing that the above
conclusions by the Superior Court violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) such that Brown is
entitled to habeas relief. The District Court denied the petition and affirmed the
conclusions reached by the Superior Court. A Certificate of Appealability was granted on
July 13, 2005, limited to the question of whether trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to object to the allegedly unconstitutional jury instruction on
reasonable doubt.1
II.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA” or the “Act”)
governs Brown’s habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).2 The Supreme Court has
1

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). This Court exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
2253.
2

The AEDPA provides in relevant part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal Law . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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interpreted § 2254(d)(1) to mean that habeas relief is appropriate when independent
federal review shows that “the state court arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or . . . on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts,” or “the state court identifie[d] the correct governing legal
principle from th[e] [Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle
to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)
(emphasis added).
In only one case, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), has the Supreme Court
held that a definition of reasonable doubt violated due process. The instruction involved
in that case informed jurors that to acquit, the doubt raised in their minds must “give rise
to a grave uncertainty,” that it must be an “actual substantial doubt,” and that “moral
certainty” as to the defendant’s guilt was required. Id. at 40. In striking the instruction
down, the Court explained:
The charge . . . equated a reasonable doubt with a “grave uncertainty” and
an “actual substantial doubt,” and stated that what was required was a
“moral certainty” that the defendant was guilty. It is plain to us that the
words “substantial” and “grave,” as they are commonly understood, suggest
a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonabledoubt standard. When those statements are then considered with the
reference to “moral certainty” . . . it becomes clear that a reasonable juror
could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a
degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 41.
Even if we assume that the jury instruction at Brown’s trial was unconstitutional,
Brown cannot show that the Superior Court’s decision requires habeas relief under
5

Williams.3 The Supreme Court’s Cage decision certainly cannot be read to stand for the
proposition that the “restraint” formulation of reasonable doubt necessarily “allow[s] a
finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process
Clause.” Cage, 498 U.S. at 41. None of the problematic terms from the Cage instruction
were present in the instruction given here. Furthermore, the Cage decision in no way
mentions or refers to the terms “restrain,” “restraint,” or “hesitate” as part of a reasonable
doubt formulation. Although the Supreme Court in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 20
(1994), tacitly approved a version of the “hesitate” definition of reasonable doubt, the
Court in Victor specifically held that “the Constitution does not require that any particular
form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof,” id. at 5,
and no Supreme Court decision has struck down any version of the “restraint”
formulation of reasonable doubt. We also note, regarding the “unreasonable application”
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Because of that conclusion, we need not pass formally on the constitutionality of the
reasonable doubt definition appearing in the jury instruction. Having said that, we note
our suspicion that the “restrain from acting” and “restraint” language as employed in the
instruction is constitutionally problematic.
The word “restraint,” as it is commonly understood – especially in conjunction
with the previous discounting of the “hesitate” standard of reasonable doubt and the
precise formulation “restrain from acting” – suggests at least as high a degree of doubt as
do the phrases “grave uncertainty” and “substantial doubt” as employed in the Cage
instruction. In fact, to the extent that we conceive of “restraint” or “restrain from acting”
in their literal sense, those words arguably go beyond “giving rise” to a grave uncertainty
or substantial doubt and become “decision-determinative,” i.e., they arguably suggest a
level of doubt that, by its terms, prevents one from acting. Stated differently, we suspect
that the formulation employed by the state trial court is one that “suggest[s] a higher
degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard.”
Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
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prong of the Williams test, that every federal court within the Eastern District to address
some version of the “restraint” formulation has upheld the formulation under direct
constitutional analysis. See Porter v. Horn, 276 F. Supp. 2d 278, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 2003);
Peterkin v. Horn, 176 F. Supp. 2d 342, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp.
2d 58 (E.D. Pa. 2001).4
Under our own precedent, we may not grant habeas relief “on the basis of simple
disagreement” with the Superior Court’s constitutional analysis. Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888.
Rather, we must be convinced that “Supreme Court precedent requires the contrary
outcome” to that reached by the Superior Court. Id. (emphasis added). We are not so
convinced. Brown may have made a compelling constitutional argument against the
reasonable doubt definition employed here, but based on the language of the instant jury
instruction and the foregoing analysis of Cage and Victor, we cannot conclude that the
Superior Court “arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court
on a question of law or . . . on a set of materially indistinguishable facts,” or that the
Court “identifie[d] the correct governing legal principle from th[e] [Supreme] Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of [Brown’s] case.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).

4

Although federal court decisions below the Supreme Court level cannot serve as the
legal benchmark against which to compare a state court’s decision, our cases state that
decisions of other federal courts are relevant in ascertaining the reasonableness of a state
court’s application of Supreme Court precedent. Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 14950 (3d Cir. 2004); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir.
1999) (en banc).
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III.
Moreover, even if we assume that the jury instruction raises grave constitutional
concerns, we agree with the conclusion of the Superior Court that Brown’s trial counsel
did not render ineffective assistance. Supreme Court precedent requires that to prevail on
an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show (1) that “counsel’s performance
was deficient,” and (2) that the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In interpreting the first prong of the
test, the Strickland Court stated that “[t]he proper standard for attorney performance is
that of reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 688. In other words, to obtain relief, a
defendant must show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id.
In assessing an attorney’s performance, a reviewing court must be “highly
deferential” and must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. This effort requires that we
“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance . . . .” Id.
Applying the Strickland standard for attorney performance, Brown cannot show
that trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the jury instruction.
In the context of reviewing the proposed jury instruction with the trial judge and opposing
counsel, trial counsel – a Pennsylvania practitioner – likely would have recognized both
8

the “hesitate” and “restrain” language as formulations that have been upheld repeatedly
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in defining reasonable doubt. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 787 A.2d 292, 301-02 (Pa. 2001) (indirectly approving an
instruction nearly identical to the instruction in Brown’s case); Commonwealth v. Ragan,
743 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1999) (explicitly approving both formulations); Commonwealth v.
Donough, 103 A.2d 694, 697 (Pa. 1954) (first case to approve the “restraint”
formulation); Commonwealth v. Kluska, 3 A.2d 398, 403 (Pa. 1939) (first case to approve
the “hesitate” formulation). Additionally, as noted in section II., supra, federal district
courts embracing Pennsylvania consistently have upheld versions of the “restrain”
formulation. In the face of such authority, a reasonable practitioner could certainly be
excused for failing to object to the instruction as worded in Brown’s case.
Even measured against the other actors in this case, counsel’s assessment of the
jury instruction as constitutional would seem to meet reasonable professional standards.
Assuming that such an assessment was erroneous, counsel’s error has since been
duplicated by at least one Pennsylvania appellate court and a federal district court on
habeas review, both of which had significantly more time – and presumably more
expertise – to bring to bear in evaluating the instruction’s constitutionality. In short, trial
counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction, even if ultimately incorrect, fell well
within the range of reasonable professional assistance under the circumstances.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Order of the District Court denying
Brown’s habeas petition.
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